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Abstract 
Populist radical right-wing parties across Europe garner support for welfare chauvinistic 
promises to limit government spending on immigrants and focus on natives’ welfare instead. 
However, most research on the so-called immigration-welfare nexus does not study welfare 
chauvinism but instead focuses on generalized support for the welfare state. Using Swedish 
register-linked survey data from 2013, we study three hypothetical pathways into welfare 
chauvinism: via ethnic prejudice, operationalized as a desire for social distance; via the direct 
experience of immigrant unemployment and putative welfare receipt in the neighborhood 
context; and via immigrant competition at the workplace. Based on our sample of native-born 
Swedes, we find that both negative prejudice and the share of unemployed immigrants among 
the neighborhood population provide two distinct and independent routes into chauvinism, 
while workplace competition does not. 
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1. Introduction  
A contentiously debated hypothesis states that national majorities are inclined to show little 
support for government expenditures that benefit groups which “they do not recognize as their 
own” and to whom they hence do not feel obliged by social proximity (Banting, 2000: 16). 
Since non-Western immigrants in particular are among the most visible outgroups across 
affluent European democracies, this relationship is likely reflected in lower support for 
spending perceived to aid such immigrants, compared to spending on members of the given 
majority. This should especially be the case when expenses are perceived as drawing on 
investments in the welfare of native citizens. The notion that there is a tradeoff between 
spending on immigrants and the government’s ability to invest in welfare for “natives” is 
often called welfare chauvinism (a term coined by Andersen and Bjørklund, 1990). Past 
research suggests that welfare chauvinism should be most pronounced in majority members 
who dislike the presence of immigrants in their immediate environments (i.e., who harbor 
affective prejudice, measured as a desire for social distance; cf. Goldschmidt, 2015; 
Gorodzeisky, 2013). It has also been argued that the effect of social distance is exacerbated 
when immigrants are not sufficiently economically integrated, that is, if they are 
overrepresented among the poor or unemployed, and thus among those likely to receive 
welfare (Burgoon, 2014; Finseraas, 2012; Luttmer, 2001; Stichnoth, 2012). Another less 
studied pathway into chauvinism is via competition for jobs and wages, such that immigrants’ 
economic integration might also incentivize natives to oppose spending on immigrants that is 
seen as drawing on the welfare of natives (cf. Burgoon et al., 2012).  
Even though there is a large and growing body of research dedicated to the so-called 
welfare/immigration nexus (Brochmann and Hagelund, 2011), very few studies have 
addressed the issue of welfare chauvinism, focusing on generalized support for the welfare 
state instead. This implies a problematic disconnect between measurement and theory and 
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also does not account for the actual political debate on immigration and welfare. After all, the 
vast majority of populist radical right-wing parties across Europe do not (or no longer) garner 
support based on promises to dismantle the welfare state per se, but rather to restrict its 
provisions to native recipients (Rydgren, 2007; Eger and Valdez, 2015).  
To address this issue, we devise a new outcome measure that contrasts native-born 
Swedes’ preferences for government spending on immigrants with those for spending on the 
elderly, who are, for the most part, native-born themselves. We study the relevance of 
affective prejudice (social distance), immigrant unemployment in the neighborhood context, 
as well as the proportion of European and non-Western immigrants at respondents’ 
workplaces for our outcome. Using register-linked Swedish survey data, we find that both 
negative prejudice and the share of unemployed immigrants among the neighborhood 
population provide two distinct and independent routes into chauvinism, while workplace 
competition does not. 
2. Rethinking Welfare Chauvinism 
Prior research defines welfare chauvinism as support for the exclusion of immigrants from the 
receipt of all or certain kinds of welfare (cf. Reeskens and van Oorschot, 2012; Waal et al., 
2010). While we do not contend that this form of chauvinism exists, we argue that another 
expression of the same sentiment is much more salient in current public debates across 
Europe.  
Like elsewhere, large-scale immigration has been met by a rise in radical right-wing 
populism in Sweden, too. Politicians and parties adhering to this ideology argue that there is a 
zero-sum tradeoff between the government’s ability to “help immigrants” in the broadest 
sense of government spending, usually without specifying which exact kinds of programs are 
being funded, and investments in welfare schemes for putative native-born citizens. This idea 
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of irreconcilability is not only purported by Sweden’s increasingly successful radical right-
wing party, the Sweden Democrats, but also by the conservative Moderaterna party. This 
became evident when former Prime Minister Reinfeldt, when asking Swedish voters to “open 
their hearts” to refugee immigration, publically announced that there can either be welfare 
(for natives) or immigration (of presumably poor people), as both are not affordable.1 
Similarly, outside of Sweden, the British “Vote Leave” campaign in the recent Brexit 
referendum also gathered much support by promising to put a stop of supposedly 
economically draining, EU-mandated migration into the UK to focus on jobs and welfare for 
native Brits instead.  
In keeping with the nature of the zero-sum claims made in Swedish and other 
European debates on migration and welfare, we conceptualize and later measure welfare 
chauvinism as the contrast between native-born Swedes’ support for two types of group-
specific government spending: on the elderly, a large and mainly native-born group of welfare 
recipients; and on immigrants, for whom it is unclear whether spending takes the form of 
welfare payments or other kinds of investment (e.g., language courses, housing development, 
etc.).  
3. Immigration and Support for Group-Specific Government Spending 
The so-called anti-solidarity hypothesis was the first to gain prominence in the debate on how 
the presence of large immigrant populations might influence the stance of majorities on 
government spending. Conceived in the era of democratic nation building, Western welfare 
states established citizenship as their primary criterion of belonging, distinguishing those who 
deserve support and empathy from those who are considered “strangers” and expected to fend 
for themselves (Marshall, 2009 [1950]). Some early European nation states, such as Belgium, 
comprised ethnically and religiously heterogeneous populations and were nevertheless able to 
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establish welfare communities based on territoriality (Pontusson, 2006). Yet today, ethno-
cultural markers of belonging to a visible majority appear to matter greatly for the attribution 
of deservingness and hence for support for government spending targeting immigrants as 
opposed to natives (Clarke and Fink, 2008; van Oorschot, 2006). In other words, given large-
scale immigration from diverse countries of origin, naturalization into the political national 
community by right and title does not automatically imply inclusion in terms of majority 
solidarity. The anti-solidarity hypothesis thus predicts that immigrants, as “outsiders”, cannot 
be made part of the welfare community without arousing the opposition of the national 
majority (Freeman, 1986; Kitschelt and McGann, 1995).  
 Existing studies vary in whether they regard anti-solidarity as motivated by group- or 
self-interest and do not provide empirical tests capable of untangling the two pathways. We 
briefly describe both theoretical pathways in turn, before section 5 explains how we restrict 
our sample to investigate them statistically.  
3.1 Ingroup Favoritism and Group Interest 
A large body of research in social psychology reveals the importance of ingroup favoritism, a 
tendency to favor and show greater concern for the wellbeing of one’s own group, when 
allocating resources (Brewer, 1979; Tajfel, 1970, 1982). According to Turner et al. (1979), 
unwillingness to share with the outgroup is independent of ingroup members’ personal self-
interest in the resources in question, as ingroup favoritism has been shown to be rooted in 
concerns for the group rather than the self. Experimental evidence even suggests that 
individuals are considerably more competitive over or protective of given resources when 
they perceive themselves as members of groups rather than as single, non-attached actors 
(Tajfel, 1982: 15).  
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Most important for the purpose of our study, both people’s willingness to share and 
their propensity to reciprocate when shared with are stronger when the social and ethno-
cultural distance among individuals is small (Bowles and Gintis, 2000). This suggests two 
hypothetical pathways into welfare chauvinism:  
First, majorities who harbor negative prejudice and desire much social distance from 
others who do not belong to their ethno-cultural ingroup may be more likely to oppose 
spending on immigrants and favor spending on natives instead, disregarding their knowledge 
or experience of how much immigrants actually benefit. In line with this notion, Blumer noted 
that majorities derive their abstract images of ethnic outgroups “in the area of the remote and 
not the near,” arguing that the immediate experience of who gets what does little to alter 
notions manifested in the “public arena,” where prejudice may indeed be salient (1954: 6). In 
other words, prejudice may suffice to raise welfare chauvinism.  
The literature investigating the interplay of anti-immigrant prejudice and majority 
attitudes toward welfare remains relatively sparse. To our knowledge, none of the existing 
studies test explicitly whether prejudice matters for welfare attitudes net of majorities’ 
experience of, for instance, immigrant unemployment as an indicator of actual welfare receipt 
or lacking economic integration. One of the few studies addressing the joint relevance of 
prejudice and the presence of non-natives for majority welfare preferences was published by 
Senik et al. (2008). Analyzing European Social Survey data from 22 countries, they found that 
a negative association between the perceived national share of immigrants and support for the 
welfare state was present only in those respondents who disliked immigrants. Gorodzeisky 
(2013) also showed that perceived economic and cultural threat only came to bear upon the 
willingness of Israeli survey respondents to keep non-Jewish workers from accessing basic 
social rights when it was mediated by prejudice.  
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Studying the interplay of subjective perceptions and empirical realities, Spies and 
Schmidt Catran (2015) found that subjective perceptions of cultural and economic threat were 
stronger predictors of social spending preferences than objective measures of immigrants’ 
presence and economic integration in Switzerland. Focusing on support for different types of 
welfare rather than generalized welfarism, Goldschmidt (2015) showed that native-born 
Germans’ desire for social distance significantly predicted their opposition to government 
assistance for the unemployed, among whose beneficiaries residents with a migration 
background tend to be overrepresented. Importantly, the effect of affective prejudice (social 
distance) appeared to be independent of respondents’ subjective assessment of the “economic 
burden” implied by immigrants’ reliance on government assistance (ibid.). 
 Second, social distance and ingroup favoritism may only become relevant for majority 
attitudes toward government spending when those who are perceived to benefit are also the 
most different from the majority with regard to important ingroup/outgroup markers, such as 
race, ethnicity, and language (Bowles and Gintis, 2000: 45). In other words, it is the 
association between lacking economic integration and “otherness” that matters, not 
“otherness” and the disliking of immigrants alone.  
There are a variety of spheres in which majorities may experience and develop notions 
of immigrant integration. Among them, residential neighborhoods have received most 
attention. Because neighborhoods are small enough to be known by their inhabitants, 
neighborhood characteristics likely serve as bases for the formation of attitudes and 
extrapolations to the general (see Hamilton and Trolier [1986] and Rydgren [2004] on 
generalizing and stereotyping as cognitive coping mechanisms). For instance, if the number of 
unemployed immigrants is high where a given respondent lives, said respondent may be more 
likely to assume that immigrants tend to be unemployed throughout the municipality, county, 
etc., than someone who does not observe immigrant unemployment on a daily basis. If this is 
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the case, we should expect that the experience of immigrant unemployment in the 
neighborhood context should be positively associated with native-born Swedes’ likelihood of 
being welfare chauvinistic rather than generally supportive of or opposed to group-specific 
government spending. 
Though many studies have investigated the relationship between majority welfare 
support and measures of immigrant outgroup sizes or ethnic diversity (see Stichnoth and Van 
der Straeten [2013] for a detailed review), much fewer have been able to test the anti-
solidarity hypothesis by considering immigrants’ economic integration. Moreover, 
disregarding the fact that the anti-solidarity proposition does not necessarily predict a decline 
in support for the welfare state per se, but rather in support for government spending that 
benefit outgroups, existing studies have overwhelmingly examined generalized support for 
welfare rather than welfare chauvinism.  
A notable exception in regard to our first criticism is a recent study by Burgoon 
(2014). Looking at a sample of 22 European societies, Burgoon concluded that the negative 
relationship between the country-level percentage of foreign-born residents and majority 
support for welfare is conditional upon the extent to which immigrants are represented among 
the unemployed and the recipients of social benefits in respondents’ more immediate 
environments. Breaking the level of analysis down to 96 European regions within 14 
countries, Finseraas (2012) also found that support for redistribution among wealthy citizens 
in particular is lower when the proportion of ethnic minorities among the poor is high. 
Studying Germany as a single case, Stichnoth (2012) found a weakly negative association 
between native-born Germans’ support for unemployment assistance and the share of 
immigrants among the unemployed at the county level. Mirroring Stichnoth’s study, Luttmer 
(2001) showed that white Americans’ support for redistribution also declines as the 
percentage of black welfare recipients residing in their neighborhood rises. Interestingly, 
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black Americans are less likely to support social assistance if they live in communities with 
larger percentages of white recipients as well, but both black and white Americans’ attitudes 
are not related to the local share of welfare beneficiaries belonging to their own ethnic group.  
 All in all, past research seems divided as to whether negative prejudice against 
immigrants may inhibit natives’ willingness to share government funds directly or whether it 
rather mediates the effect of actually experienced immigrant integration or reliance on 
government assistance (cf. Bowles and Gintis, 2000). Drawing on this divide, we test the 
following hypotheses: 
H1 (ingroup favoritism due to prejudice/social distance):  
Negative prejudice against immigrants is positively associated with native-born Swedes’ 
likelihood of being welfare chauvinistic, net of their actual experience of immigrant 
unemployment in their neighborhood of residence. 
H2 (ingroup favoritism due to lacking outgroup integration):  
Experience of immigrant unemployment in the neighborhood context is positively associated 
with native-born Swedes’ likelihood of being welfare chauvinistic. 
H3 (prejudice as a mediator of lacking outgroup integration): 
The direct observation of immigrant unemployment in the neighborhood of residence is 
associated with a desire for greater social distance (affective prejudice), which then increases 
the likelihood of welfare chauvinism.  
3.2 Compensation and Self-Interest 
The neighborhood is not the only social sphere with the potential to influence majority 
attitudes. Most adults spend nearly as much of their time at workplaces as they do at home. 
One set of hypotheses has already stated that observing immigrant unemployment in the 
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neighborhood context is likely to trigger ingroup favoritism and the exclusivist pursuit of 
ingroup welfare, even among those who are themselves working and hence unlikely to 
compete directly for the same kinds of resources as poor or unemployed immigrants and 
natives. Foreign colleagues at the workplace may, however, be competition for a very 
different set of tangible economic resources, such wages. Immigrants with qualification levels 
similar to or exceeding those of the majority population are particularly relevant competitors. 
The compensation hypothesis thus predicts that the increased presence of qualified 
immigrants leads natives to fear wage depression and job loss, which ultimately causes them 
to demand more social protection (Finseraas, 2008), or that less be spent on immigrants.2 
While experiences in the neighborhood may trigger a group-interest-based desire for the 
exclusion of immigrants even among comparatively well-off natives, workplace encounters 
may thus incentivize chauvinism based on self-interest. We test 
H4 (self-interest and compensation):  
Experience of immigrant competition at the workplace is positively associated with native-
born Swedes’ likelihood of being welfare chauvinistic. 
Since most adults are exposed to both workplace and neighborhood settings, we have 
to ask how both sets of experiences interact to shape preferences for government spending. 
One possible scenario is that the combined threat to group- and self-interest increases majority 
chauvinism more than one without the other. This line of reasoning is supported by Breznau 
and Eger (2016), who find that majorities’ material self-interest and their understanding of 
group-boundaries, that is, the degree to which they seek to defend their (in-)group interest by 
excluding immigrants, interact to shape support for the welfare state. We thus test  
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H5 (self-interest moderates group-interest): 
The positive relationship between the proportion of unemployed immigrants in the 
neighborhood and native Swedes’ likelihood of being welfare chauvinistic is moderated by 
exposure to immigrant co-workers of similar qualification, with higher workplace exposure 
strengthening the neighborhood-level association (or vice versa).  
To address the issue of competitive qualifications, we distinguish between coworkers 
from EU 27 and non-Western countries of origin.  
 To our knowledge, no prior study has investigated job competition at the level of 
workplaces as a source of low solidarity with immigrants as opposed to natives. However, 
investigating majority demands for compensation, expressed as support for welfare in general, 
a few recent papers have nevertheless provided evidence for the compensation argument. 
Brady and Finnigan (2014) have shown that residents of 17 wealthy democracies were 
significantly more likely to demand higher social spending on health, pensions, and 
unemployment as their home countries’ net migration increased. In addition, they found that 
immigration flows were negatively associated with support for government intervention that 
is explicitly universal in character, thus precluding the exclusion of immigrants. They take 
this to suggests that immigration “heightens perceptions of competition, instability, and 
insecurity,” increasing both support for government compensation and welfare chauvinism 
(Brady and Finnigan, 2014: 35). While Brady and Finnigan’s study does not allow us to infer 
where and how this sense of competition and insecurity might be experienced, Burgoon et al. 
(2012) showed that natives across European societies who face higher levels of foreign-born 
competition in their employment sectors are significantly more likely to display pro-
redistribution attitudes. They also interpret their finding to signify that native majorities’ fear 
of losing jobs and wages due to foreign competition spurs their demand for redistributive 
government intervention (cf. Finseraas, 2008).  
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4. Sweden as a Test Case  
In the 1950s and 1960s, government-mandated labor migration schemes caused a first wave 
of large-scale migration to Sweden, introducing a previously unknown component of diversity 
to the Swedish welfare community. Even after the labor migration policy was discontinued in 
the 1970s, family reunions, work-related immigration, and refugee inflows from countries 
plagued by humanitarian crises continued to increase Sweden’s foreign-born population. 
Figure 1 shows that between 1990 and 2012 alone, the number of non-natives granted 
residency has nearly quintupled, from about 35,000 to 170,000 persons per year. The vast 
majority of foreign-born residents settled in Sweden for work purposes. However, given the 
ongoing refugee crisis and the observable, widely discussed and reported differences of many 
asylum seeker groups (e.g., in terms of religion and language), it is likely that majority 
attitudes toward immigrants’ inclusion in the welfare state are currently driven by citizens’ 
stance on refugees. Public opinion may thus not account for the fact that Sweden’s total 
foreign-born population is actually marked by a rather unique degree of diversity in national 
origins and social prospects, with the five largest groups hailing from Finland, Iraq, Poland, 
the former Yugoslavia, and Iran (Statistics Sweden, 2014). 
Sweden is the EU country with the fourth highest number of foreign-born nationals 
per capita (exceeded only by Luxemburg, Malta, and Cyprus; Eurostat, 2015). Yet, as in many 
other countries, poverty and immigrant status are closely associated. In 2007, 28 percent of all 
immigrants born outside and 17 percent of those born inside the EU faced poverty in Sweden, 
while merely 11.5 percent of all native-born Swedes had similarly low income levels (Fritzell 
et al., 2012). This is also reflected in the over-representation of immigrants among the 
recipients of means-tested social assistance, where the immigrant/native ratio was 12 to 2 
percent in 2008 (Gustafsson, 2011).  
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Figure 1. Number of residence permits granted to foreign-born persons (Sweden, 1990-2012) 
Note: Based on data from the Swedish Migration Board (2014) 
Motivated by these realities, Eger (2010) studied the relationship between the size of 
immigrant populations across Swedish counties and individual attitudes toward social 
spending. Eger found that “the proximity of an [ethnic] outgroup negatively affects attitudes 
about the allocation of resources” (2010: 211). Her conclusion was supported by Dahlberg et 
al. (2012), who claimed to establish a causal link between ethnic heterogeneity and lowered 
majority support for redistribution. They did so by exploiting exogenous variation in non-
Western immigrant shares resulting from a Sweden-wide policy operating between 1985 and 
1994 that aimed at distributing newly arriving refugees evenly across the country’s 
municipalities (but see Nekby and Pettersson-Lidbom, 2012). 
 The use of government assistance by immigrants and, in particular, asylum seekers is 
contentiously debated in Swedish politics and media discourses. Yet Eger (2010) and 
Dahlberg et al.’s (2012) focus on support for social spending in general does not adequately 
reflect the ideological thrust of these debates. Rather than demanding the dismantling of the 
welfare state as a whole, Sweden’s radical right-wing party, the Sweden Democrats (SD), 
garners support around a clearly welfare chauvinistic demand of welfare ‘for natives only’ 
(Mulinari and Neergaard, 2014). Succeeding on their welfare chauvinistic agenda, SD entered 
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the national parliament for the first time in 2010, then securing 5.7 percent of the votes and 
further increasing their vote share to 12.9 percent in the 2014 general election.  
The electoral success of the SD suggests that chauvinism and anti-immigrant 
sentiment are becoming increasingly manifest in some parts of the Swedish population 
(Rydgren and van der Meiden, 2016). At the same time, average attitudes toward immigration 
have become more positive over the past twenty years, and far more accepting than the 
European average (Demker 2014). But how are we to explain the co-existence of such 
widespread openness and fierce opposition to immigration in general and immigrants’ 
dependence on welfare in particular?  
 One potential answer – and the focus of this paper – lies in the fact that individuals in 
Sweden receive their cues about immigration and its relation to issues of state-funded welfare 
from a variety of contexts. Importantly, while political debates and media reports tend to 
focus on larger, administratively relevant units of aggregation, such as municipalities, the 
degree to which such accounts become attitudinally relevant may well depend on where 
people actually spend their everyday lives.  
Ethnic residential enclaves are very uncommon in Sweden and most immigrant-dense 
neighborhoods are heterogeneous with regard to national origins. Figure 2 shows that even 
though native-born Swedes and foreign-born residents are exposed to very different degrees 
of housing segregation, many of the native-born are exposed to at least some immigrants 
within their neighborhoods.  
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Figure 2. Neighborhood segregation (proportion foreign-born) experienced by native-born Swedes and foreign-born 
residents in 2012 
Note: Calculations based on the Longitudinal Integration Database for Health Insurance and Labour Market Studies (LISA, national 
registry); neighborhoods are defined as SAMS units 
 
In contrast to the neighborhoods, immigrants tend to be segregated from natives in 
workplaces. Åslund and Nordström Skans (2010) have reported that “even when accounting 
for age, gender, education, region, and industry, the average immigrant has 40 percent more 
immigrants in his or her workplace” than expected from a completely random distribution, 
while “natives are on average underexposed” to immigrant colleagues in Sweden (2010: 489). 
Foreign-born groups with low employment rates are most segregated from natives (ibid.).  
Non-Western immigrants in particular face harsher economic conditions than native-
born citizens in the Swedish labor market. Even seven years after immigration, non-Western 
immigrants’ levels of employment are well below those of native-born Swedes or Western 
immigrants (Nekby, 2002). They face substantially higher unemployment risks (Arai and 
Vilhelmsson, 2004), earn lower wages (le Grand and Szulkin, 2002), and tend to be 
segregated into lower-ranked jobs (Åslund and Nordström Skans, 2010) than natives. There is 
also some evidence of direct discrimination in the hiring process (Carlsson and Rooth, 2007). 
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Consequently, the Swedish workers most likely to experience contact with non-Western 
immigrants in particular are those who are also employed in lower-status, lower-income jobs, 
whose often precarious working conditions arguably render them concerned about 
government compensation for potential job loss. To address this relationship, we control for 
occupation types and investigate the relationship between welfare attitudes and the proportion 
of non-Western and non-Nordic, European colleagues separately. 
5. Analytical Approach 
To empirically test our hypotheses, we use data from the Swedish Social Networks and 
Xenophobia Survey. Telephone interviews were conducted with a random sample of the 
Swedish population between November 2013 and February 2014, and achieved a response 
rate of about 50 percent.3 Additional respondent information was retrieved from 
administrative registers. Since this study aims at investigating the Swedish majority public’s 
attitudes, foreign-born residents with non-Swedish parents as well as respondents with two 
foreign-born parents (second-generation immigrants) were excluded from the analyses. The 
final sample comprises 1,085 native-born Swedes who were employed at the time of the 
survey. Limiting the sample to those currently employed allows us to test all of our 
hypotheses on the same sample, allowing for comparability across models. Focusing on the 
employed excludes those who might oppose spending on immigrants because they compete 
for government aid that they themselves might be receiving (means-tested social assistance in 
particular). It also excludes those who are on old-age or disability pensions, which gives them 
a strong and immediate self-interest in safeguarding such provisions. By limiting the kind of 
immigrant-majority competition relevant to our respondents to the sphere of employment, we 
can test the self-interest-based compensation hypothesis by looking at workplace 
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compositions and the meaning of group-interest and ingroup favoritism (that should be 
independent of competition) by studying the neighborhood association.  
The dependent variable is constructed from four answer combinations on two survey 
questions (Figure 3). In weighing spending on immigrants against spending on the old and the 
sick, who are likely thought of as native (van Oorschot, 2006), the measure seeks to capture 
the imagined zero-sum trade-off between government spending on immigrants and 
investments in welfare for natives that characterizes the politically salient form of welfare 
chauvinism we describe in Section 2.  
 
 
Figure 3. Dependent variable 
Note: N=1,085 
 
Levels of support for government intervention are known to be high among the 
Swedish majority, both over time and compared to other European societies (cf. Svallfors, 
2011). It is thus not surprising that the majority (62%) of our Swedish sample supports 
increased spending on immigrants and the elderly alike. Yet, a non-trivial 28% believe that 
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the government spends too little on the old and sick, but too much on immigrants. They 
constitute our group of welfare chauvinists. 
Since Sweden already invests quite a lot in old-age pensions, the group of generalized 
supporters (62%) is difficult to distinguish from those who do not agree that more should be 
spent on the elderly, but also do not think that too much is spent on immigrants (7%). Since 
we do not know whether they would like to see a cut in spending on the elderly, respondents 
might actually believe that current spending levels are “just right.” Coupled with the notion 
that more should be spent on immigrants, this support pattern might indicate generalized 
support for a non-discriminatory government investment strategy in its own right.  
Overall, Figure 3 suggests that the main fault line in our Swedish respondents’ 
attitudes toward group-specific government spending is the question of whether immigrants 
should be included or not, with very few being opposed to spending on socially vulnerable 
groups more broadly (3%). In our analyses, we thus collapse the four categories into a binary 
outcome that predicts the likelihood of classifying as welfare chauvinistic as opposed to 
having any other spending preference. However, in the future, it would be interesting to 
construct our contrast measure for another, non-Nordic sample, where cell counts will likely 
be more balanced and all four answer combinations can be meaningfully contrasted. It should 
also be noted that we performed another set of analyses (available upon request) using 
multinomial logistic regression to estimate respondents’ likelihood of falling into any of the 
cells specified in Figure 3, with generalized support as the reference category. Throughout 
most of the multinomial models, we find that welfare chauvinism is the outcome category that 
is most persistently, statistically significantly related to our key predictors. Given that the 
associational findings are virtually the same for both our multinomial and logistic outcome 
specification, we decided to present the more easily accessible binary results. 
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Our predictors of main interest are variables describing respondents’ neighborhoods of 
residence, workplaces, as well as a scale constructed to capture prejudice against immigrants 
(see Appendices 1 and 2 for a descriptive overview).  
The neighborhood characteristic of primary interest is the proportion of foreign-born 
unemployed individuals among the total neighborhood population. Neighborhoods are 
defined as so-called SAMS (Small Areas for Market Statistics) units. SAMS units are based 
on local government areas within the larger municipalities and electoral districts. There are 
9,200 SAMS areas in Sweden, nested within the 290 municipalities. Due to their small size 
and the typical structure of Swedish cities and towns, in which housing areas are built around 
their own local shopping, GP, and community centers, SAMS units can be expected to 
measure experienced neighborhood settings (cf. Edling and Rydgren, 2012).  
 For workplaces, our main predictors represent the proportion of co-workers born 
within the EU27 (excluding the Nordic Region) and the proportion of employees coming from 
outside the EU or the Nordic Region. The two measures are significantly positively 
correlated, but the strength of the correlation is very modest (r=.15). This is likely due to the 
fact that EU and non-Western immigrants face different labor market opportunities and thus 
usually do not occupy the same types of workplaces (Adsera and Chiswick, 2007). 
 Prejudice is measured by the standard Bogardus social distance scale, which is 
constructed from items asking respondents whether they would mind having an immigrant 
marry into their family, become their boss, be their coworker, or live next door (Bogardus, 
1933). The additive index ranges from 1 to 5, with higher values indicating a greater desire 
for distance (Cronbach’s α = .83).  
 Since the survey is based on a random sample of the Swedish population and the 
number of neighborhoods and workplaces is large, we mostly observe only one case (for very 
few areas, up to three cases) per context. Consequently, modeling the neighborhood and 
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workplace associations in a multilevel framework is not possible, but the independence of 
observations is likely given and the traditional single-level approach seems appropriate. We 
do, however, adjust the standard errors for clustering within municipalities.  
 Given that our regression-based analyses are performed on cross-sectional data, the 
observed relationships must be understood as associations rather than (causal) effects. Self-
selection is another issue raised by the design of our study. Is it likely that native-born Swedes 
who feel more positive toward redistribution and immigrants are more likely to, e.g., move 
into or stay in neighborhoods with higher proportions of (unemployed) non-native residents? 
We cannot exclude this possibility. However, we argue that self-selection by preferences for 
redistribution and native/non-native composition is much less likely to be an issue in 
workplaces than in areas of residence (Mutz and Mondak, 2006). For the neighborhood 
context, people with more negative attitudes toward immigrants and immigration can 
probably be expected to select out of places with large proportions of poor or unemployed 
immigrants. However, since these are also the people whom we would expect to be most 
likely to display exclusionary, welfare chauvinistic attitudes, self-selection should make our 
expected positive association less likely, not more. In other words, the fact that we find the 
neighborhood proportion of unemployed immigrants to be positively associated with the 
likelihood of being classified as welfare chauvinistic rather than generally supportive of 
welfare should be regarded as a rather conservative estimate, given the likely selection 
pattern.  
To account for self-selection into neighborhoods as well as for alternative explanations 
of welfare attitudes, we control for a number of individual demographic and socioeconomic 
characteristics. These variables include neighborhood tenure, age, gender, civil status, the 
presence of children in the household, household income, educational attainment (in years), 
and a set of occupational indicators (e.g., unskilled, skilled, routine manual, etc.). In addition, 
20 
 
municipality, neighborhood, and workplace characteristics that might confound the 
relationship between the proportion of immigrants and welfare attitudes are considered as 
well (see Appendix 1). 
6. Findings 
 
Figure 4. Hypothesized pathways  
Figure 4 summarizes the hypothesized pathways linking prejudice and majorities’ experience 
of immigrant integration and welfare chauvinism. In Table 1 (T1), we predict welfare 
chauvinism as defined by our binary indicator variable using logistic regression, reporting 
average marginal effects with municipality cluster-adjusted standard errors in parentheses. We 
start by estimating the direct associations between our outcome and prejudice as well as 
experience of immigrant unemployment in the neighborhood setting, before we turn to 
discussing how prejudice might mediate the latter association. Thereafter, we estimate the 
direct association between chauvinism and workplace exposure to immigrants, also testing 
whether the exposure variable moderates the neighborhood-level experience of immigrant 
unemployment.  
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Table 1. Prejudice and experience of immigrants' economic integration as predictors of welfare chauvinism  
  M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 
Neighborhood 
     P foreign-born in unemployment 0.267* 
(0.13) 
0.248* 
(0.12) 
0.289* 
(0.13) 
0.299* 
(0.14) 
0.297+ 
(0.15) 
 IQR disposable hh income -0.416+ 
(0.23) 
-0.353+ 
(0.21) 
-0.437* 
(0.22) 
-0.438* 
(0.22) 
-0.435+ 
(0.22)  
ln density -0.002 
(0.01) 
-0.002 
(0.01) 
-0.002 
(0.01) 
-0.002 
(0.01) 
-0.002 
(0.01) 
 Individual 
     Neighborhood tenure 0.002 
(0.00) 
0.001 
(0.00) 
0.002 
(0.00) 
0.002 
(0.00) 
0.002 
(0.00)  
Prejudice ⎯ 0.118*** 
(0.01) 
⎯ ⎯ ⎯ 
     Workplace 
     P EU27 colleagues ⎯ ⎯ -0.118 
(0.14) 
-0.051 
(0.23) 
-0.118 
(0.14)    
P non-Western colleagues ⎯ ⎯ 0.008 
(0.12) 
0.011 
(0.12) 
0.041 
(0.29)    
P women ⎯ ⎯ -0.193*** 
(0.04) 
-0.192*** 
(0.04) 
-0.193*** 
(0.04)    
ln workplace size ⎯ ⎯ 0.004 
(0.01) 
0.004 
(0.01) 
0.004 
(0.01) 
   Interactions 
     imm. unemployment in nbh x  
EU colleagues 
⎯ ⎯ ⎯ -0.628 
(1.92) 
⎯ 
imm. unemployment in nbh x  
non-Western colleagues 
⎯ ⎯ ⎯  -0.195 
(1.48) 
Pseudo R-squared 0.142 0.201 0.153 0.153 0.153 
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
    Note: N= 1,085; coefficients describe average marginal effects; standard errors in parentheses, adjusted for clustering 
within 232 municipalities; all models control for municipality characteristics (see Appendix 1) and additional individual 
socio-demographic variables (age, gender [female], civil status [single/married/widowed], presence of children in the 
household [yes/no], household income [SEK/month], education [years], occupation type [indicators]). 
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As expected, the association between a given respondent’s degree of prejudice – her 
desire to exclude immigrants from her direct environments – and probability of being 
classified as welfare chauvinistic – believing that too little is spent on the old while too much 
is spent on immigrants, rather than choosing any other response configuration on these two 
items – is statistically significant and positive. This is true both in the bivariate setting 
(Appendix 3, A1) and after introducing an extensive set of control variables (T1, M2). 
Prejudice thus constitutes a statistically significant predictor of welfare chauvinism even net 
of respondents’ actual experience of immigrant unemployment and putative dependence on 
government spending, rendering support for Hypothesis 1. The changes in predicted 
probabilities of chauvinism across levels of prejudice are quite substantial. A respondent with 
an average prejudice score of about 2 (out of 5, where 5 signifies the greatest desire for social 
distance) and mean values at each of the remaining covariates, is predicted to have a 25-
percent probability of being classified as welfare chauvinistic. That probability increases to 42 
percent with a prejudice score of 3, and again to 62 percent with a prejudice score of 4 (not 
shown; differences are statistically significant with p<0.001). But does prejudice constitute an 
independent pathway into chauvinism or is it rather an intervening variable, mediating the 
association between neighborhood exposure and our outcome?  
The estimation of mediation effects continues to be a very active field of research, 
resulting in a large variety of estimation procedures. While structural equation models are 
now widely used to estimate mediation involving continuous mediators and outcomes, the 
estimation and, above all, interpretation of mediation involving categorical variables within a 
generalized structural equation framework is still problematic. We thus follow the traditional 
four-step method of inferring mediation proposed by Baron and Kenny (1986) and use the 
Product of Coefficients approach to estimate the magnitude of the mediation, utilizing the 
Stata command binary_mediation, written by Ender (UCLA, Statistical Consulting Group). 
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After we establish that there is an association that might be mediated (Baron and Kenny’s step 
1; T1, M2), binary_mediation estimates first, the association between our independent 
variable [IV] of main interest and the potential mediator [M] (step 2; IV as a predictor of M – 
not shown), and then establishes that M affects our outcome [Y] (step 3; M and X as 
predictors of Y; T1, M2). The magnitude of the indirect or mediated effect is then calculated 
as the product of the (standardized) coefficients for both separate paths ([XM]*[MXY]).  
Starting with step 1, we find that the association between the proportion of 
unemployed immigrants in a respondent’s neighborhood and said respondent’s probability of 
being classified as welfare chauvinistic is positive and statistically significant, both before 
(Appendix 3, A2) and after an extensive set of neighborhood, municipality, individual (T1, 
M1) and, eventually, workplace characteristics (T1, M3) are introduced to account for 
alternative explanations of the observed association. With the exception of neighborhood 
wealth, the proportion of unemployed immigrants attains the largest average marginal effect 
in the fully controlled models. To illustrate the magnitude of the association, Figure 5 shows 
predicted probabilities of chauvinism across levels of exposure to immigrant unemployment 
when all other variables included in Model 1 (T1) are held at their mean. At baseline, native-
born Swedes who do not have any unemployed immigrants in their neighborhoods (4 percent 
of our respondents) have a 22-percent probability of being classified as welfare chauvinistic. 
However, once around 20 percent (our sample mean) of the neighborhood population are 
made up of unemployed immigrants, the predicted probability of chauvinism goes up to as 
much as 81 percent. In both the zero- and twenty-percent scenarios, the “mean respondent” 
under investigation is a 47-year-old, childless, single man, who has lived in his neighborhood 
for about 10 years. Of course, setting covariates at different levels will slightly change 
predicted probabilities, but the overall trend of quite rapidly increasing chauvinism with rising 
immigrant unemployment remains. We thus consider hypothesis 2 confirmed – the higher the 
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share of unemployed immigrants within a native-born respondents’ neighborhood, the higher 
the likelihood of him or her harboring welfare chauvinistic attitudes.  
Because we now know that both prejudice and the proportion of unemployed 
immigrants in the neighborhood are independently and positively associated with our 
outcome, we can exclude the possibility of full mediation and merely explore the possibility 
of prejudice serving as a partial mediator (step 4 in Baron and Kenny, 1986). However, we 
find the proportion of the total association between immigrant unemployment and chauvinism 
mediated by prejudice to be negligible and indeed not statistically significantly different from 
zero. We fail to establish that our neighborhood variable is statistically significantly correlated 
with the prejudice (given the fully specified model), which must be the case for the latter to 
serve as a mediator (step 2). We still perform step 3 and find that merely five percent of the 
total effect is mediated by prejudice. Using bootstrapping (500 replications), we estimate 
confidence intervals for our coefficients and, expectedly, find that they contain zero. We thus 
do not find support for Hypothesis 3.  
 
Figure 5. Probability of welfare chauvinism across levels of immigrant unemployment 
Note: Predicted probabilities from Model 1, Table 1; line drawn for illustrative purposes only, with probabilities being 
calculated in 5-percent steps from 0 to 40 percent unemployed immigrants in the neighborhood of residence and all covariates 
held constant at their mean; all differences across levels of exposure are statistically significant at p<.001. 
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 In Model 3, we turn to investigating the compensation hypothesis, that is, the self-
interest-based explanation of anti-solidarity. Neither working with non-Western nor 
European-born colleagues is statistically significantly associated with our binary outcome, 
both before and after controls are added to the model (cf. Appendix 3, A2 and A3; Table 1, 
M2). We do, however, have to concede, that those who work themselves and fear losses due 
to immigrant competition may not necessarily align their opposition to spending on 
immigrants with an endorsement of spending on the elderly, just by virtue of them being 
native. If it is self-interest that drives their attitudes toward government spending (cf. section 
3.2), they might support investments that benefit them (working, native-born Swedes), but not 
other Swedes more broadly. This is something we cannot pick up with our contrast measure, 
but which studies operationalizing welfare chauvinism as exclusionary attitudes toward 
immigrants alone or studying support for the welfare state more broadly cannot disentangle 
either. The development of even more refined measures of group-specific spending 
preferences thus seems to be a promising avenue for future research, and our inability to 
confirm the compensation hypothesis (Hypothesis 4) should be regarded as tentative. 
 Looking at Models 4 and 5, we also see that the independently positive association 
between neighborhood exposure to immigrants in unemployment is not moderated, that is, 
intensified by workplace exposure to immigrants (Hypothesis 5). Unfortunately, given our 
relatively small sample (1,085 cases) and the resulting limitations in statistical power, we 
need to be wary of producing estimates liable to type II error when performing this kind of 
stratified analysis. In other words, it is quite possible that we are falsely retaining the null 
hypothesis according to which workplace encounters neither intensify nor abate the strongly 
positive association between immigrant unemployment and welfare chauvinism. Hopefully, a 
repetition of the survey used here will deliver a larger sample providing us with sufficient 
statistical power to reassess the interaction term.  
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7. Conclusion 
Past research has well established that social solidarity, especially within the context of 
redistribution and welfare, and large-scale immigration are conflictual. This paper sought to 
contribute to our understanding of how this conflict comes about. Using Sweden as a case 
study, we investigated three hypothetical pathways into welfare chauvinism – the perceived 
tradeoff between government investments in the welfare of natives and spending on 
immigrants: via ethnic prejudice, operationalized as a desire for social distance; via the direct 
experience of immigrant unemployment and putative welfare receipt in the neighborhood 
context; and via immigrant competition at the workplace.  
We found a strong and persistently positive association between the direct observation 
of immigrant unemployment in proximate neighborhood settings and native-born Swedes’ 
propensity to prefer spending on the (native) elderly over spending on immigrants. This 
provides support for the frequently voiced concern that a lack in economic integration among 
immigrants can be detrimental to social solidarity (Burgoon, 2014; Finseraas 2012). As 
immigrants’ integration into workplaces does not appear to have the expected chauvinism-
bolstering effect, policies that seek to enhance social solidarity by providing new 
opportunities for work to decrease the association between immigrant-status and welfare 
receipt thus seem promising. However, due to statistical power issues, our non-significant 
workplace associations should be considered with care.  
 In an earlier survey experiment, Bay and Pedersen (2006) showed that a substantial 
sub-group among their Norwegian participants, who had initially been supportive of a 
universal basic income, became opposed once they were made aware that non-citizens would 
benefit too. This suggests that public discourses are likely to raise outgroup resentment and 
distancing, which has important consequences for social solidarity above and beyond 
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empirical realities of who benefits from what and why. Our finding that the desire for social 
distance from immigrants is positively associated with welfare chauvinism, even net of 
respondents’ actual experience of immigrant unemployment, is equally telling in this regard. 
However, our understanding of how public discourses in media and politics structure support 
for different kinds of government intervention remains relatively limited (but see Petersen et 
al., 2011; Slothuus, 2007). Is it, for instance, the mere fact that immigrants are frequently 
mentioned as beneficiaries of government spending that turns majorities against supporting 
such investments or is it a more specific framing of immigrants as undeserving abusers of 
such support (a distinction also made by Bay and Pedersen, 2006: 432)? And is it, in turn, 
possible to harness public communications to alter preconceived chauvinism, or do such 
discourses only serve to harden existing prejudice with little or no power to abate it? Future 
research on the mechanisms linking large-scale migration and social solidarity will be crucial 
to ultimately reconcile both.  
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Appendices 
Appendix 1. Key independent variables  
Variable  Mean SD Min Max 
Prejudice  
Bogardus social distance scale  
1.749 0.839 1 5 
     
MUNICIPALITY     
Proportion foreign-born in unemployment  0.212 0.057 0.094 0.422 
IQR disposable income  
Interquartile range (p75–p25) of ln disposable 
income corrected for family size in municipality 
4.955 0.107 4.449 5.375 
     
NEIGHBORHOOD     
Proportion foreign-born in unemployment 0.166 0.090 0 0.545 
IQR disposable income 
Interquartile range (p75–p25) of ln disposable 
income corrected for family size in SAMS. 
0.725 0.122 0 3.873 
ln density  
ln population density  
6.10 2.573 -1.554 10.306 
     
WORKPLACE     
Proportion EU colleagues 
Proportion of individuals born in one of the EU 
27 member states (as of 2012, w/o Croatia), 
excluding the Nordic region 
0.020 0.055 0 1 
Proportion non-Western colleagues 
Proportion of individuals born outside of 
Europe, the US, Canada and Australia  
0.054 0.090 0 1 
Proportion female colleagues 0.480 0.327 0 1 
ln establishment size 3.579 2.110 0 9.320 
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Appendix 2. Correlations among key independent variables                
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
(1) Prejudice 1.00 
         MUNICIPALITY 
          (2) P foreign-born in unemployment 0.08 
(0.01) 
1.00         
         
(3) IQR disposable hh income -0.07 
(0.03) 
-0.33 
(0.00) 
1.00        
         
NEIGHBORHOOD            
(4) P foreign-born in unemployment 0.05 
(0.12) 
0.38 
(0.00) 
-0.14 
(0.00) 
1.00       
        
(5) IQR disposable hh income -0.06 
(0.06) 
-0.18 
(0.00) 
-0.06 
(0.04) 
-0.12 
(0.00) 
1.00      
       
(6) ln density -0.09 
(0.00) 
-0.27 
(0.00) 
0.05 
(0.08) 
0.06 
(0.05) 
0.09 
(0.00) 
1.00     
      
WORKPLACE           
(7) P non-Western colleagues -0.04 
(0.17) 
-0.14 
(0.00) 
0.01 
(0.86) 
-0.03 
(0.40) 
0.10 
(0.00) 
0.21 
(0.00) 
1.00    
     
(8) P EU colleagues -0.03 
(0.27) 
-0.10 
(0.00) 
-0.02 
(0.50) 
-0.06 
(0.04) 
0.03 
(0.25) 
0.02 
(0.46) 
0.15 
(0.00) 
1.00   
    
(9) P female colleagues -0.20 
(0.00) 
-0.02 
(0.57) 
-0.00 
(0.87) 
0.01 
(0.75) 
-0.00 
(0.87) 
0.05 
(0.13) 
0.06 
(0.06) 
-0.04 
(0.24) 
1.00  
(10) ln establishment size -0.09 
(0.00) 
-0.07 
(0.02) 
0.01 
(0.86) 
-0.03 
(0.33) 
-0.00 
(0.90) 
0.09 
(0.00) 
0.24 
(0.00) 
0.09 
(0.00) 
0.11 
(0.00) 
1.00 
   
Note: N=1,085; p values in parentheses  
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Appendix 3: Bivariate Associations 
  A1 A2 A3 A4 
Prejudice 0.166*** 
(0.01) 
   
Neighborhood     
P foreign-born in unemployment  0.332* 
(0.14) 
  
Workplace     
P EU27 colleagues   -0.113 
(0.21) 
 
P non-Western colleagues    -0.073 
(0.14) 
Pseudo R-squared 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.117 
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
   Note: N= 1,085; coefficients describe average marginal effects; standard errors in parentheses, 
adjusted for clustering within 232 municipalities 
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Notes 
                                                        
1  In his speech on August 16, 2014, Reinfeldt stated: “I can already say that there will be 
substantial costs to accommodate these people [asylum seekers]. In fact, the costs are so 
extensive that it will put further restrictions on what we can do within the limits of our 
public finances. Therefore we promise almost nothing in this election; there will be no 
room for it” (authors’ translation from Swedish as cited in Pettersson Normark, 2014). 
2  Another potentially counteracting mechanism may also be at play: If we follow the logic of 
our previous argument on how individuals generalize from their particular experience, then 
people working with a higher number of immigrants could be assumed to take their 
workplace encounters to imply that the unemployment rate among immigrants is relatively 
low (at least in comparison to the assessment made by those working in less heterogeneous 
workplaces). For instance, if native-born workers meet a lot of employed immigrants, they 
may generalize to the population of immigrants and assume that their presence implies 
lower costs to the welfare state than widely suggested, making these natives indeed less 
likely to display welfare chauvinism. While this is neither in line with our empirical 
findings nor with prior research, this alternative theoretical pathway should be borne in 
mind. 
3  Despite the relatively low response rate, comparisons with external administrative statistics 
confirm that our sample represents the Swedish population well in terms of age, sex ratio, 
educational attainment, and support for various political parties. 
 
 
 
 
